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Erratum
Page 429, lines 18-22 should read: "This holding is not inconsistent with the theory of dividend ownership of
leased premises developed in City of Toledo v. Jenkins 2 and Carney v. Ohio Turnpike Commission.3 The court
expressly overruled its decision in City of Dayton v. Haines." 4
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transfer of a contribution rate from one employer to another does
not ipso facto affect the subsequent rate of the employer whose rate
was transferred, and no appeal need be afforded where the employer
found to be the predecessor in interest was already at the minimum
statutory rate and did not appear to be aggrieved.
EDWIN R. TEPLE
TAXATION
The most notable developments in Ohio tax law in 1959 were leg-
islative rather than judicial. Changes are especially significant in the
area of sales and use taxation. Some of the more important statu-
tory changes are noted in connection with the various subdivisions in
this article.
EXEMPTIONS OF PUBLIC PROPERTY
The supreme court decided several cases construing Ohio Revised
Code section 5709.08, which exempts governmental and public prop-
erty from taxation. In City of Dayton v. Haines,' the court held
that real property owned by the city and leased to the United States
for use as a reserve training area was "public property used exclu-
sively for a public purpose" within the meaning of the statute and
therefore exempt from taxation. This holding is not inconsistent
sion.3 The court expressly overruled its decision in City of Dayton
with the theory of dividend ownership of leased premises developed
in City of Toledo v. Jenkins2 and Carney v. Ohio Turnpike Commis-
v. Haines.4
Another problem before the supreme court in connection with the
application of Ohio Revised Code section 5709.08 concerned the mat-
ter of intended, rather than actual, use "for a public purpose."5 The
City of Cleveland acquired certain property for the purpose of ex-
pansion of a library. Numerous structural changes were necessary
before the building would be ready for actual library use, and on tax-
listing day the city had not started the alterations. The court held
that a contemplated use constituted a "use" within the purview of the
statute. The court acknowledged that a strict construction of the
1. 169 Ohio St 191, 158 N.E.2d 201 (1959).
2. 143 Ohio St. 141, 54 N.E.2d 656 (1944).
3. 167 Ohio St. 273, 147 N.E.2d 857 (1958).
4. 156 Ohio St. 366, 102 N.E.2d 590 (1951).
5. Carney v. Cleveland City School Dist. Pub. Library, 169 Ohio St. 65, 157 N.E.2d 311
(1959). This decision was followed in City of Cleveland v. Carney, 169 Ohio St. 259, 158
N.E.2d 895 (1959), a case in which realty was acquired with the intention of using it as an
incinerator site.
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exemption statutes would require a different conclusion, but stated
that strict construction must be tempered with reason and since "the
sole legitimate purpose of taxation is to benefit the public, to tax
property already devoted to public use would be merely to divert
funds from one public benefit to another."6  The present case, in
effect, extends the rule promulgated under similar statutes, that
property being converted to public use in which construction has com-
menced is exempt, 7 to a situation in which the realty has merely been
acquired for an anticipated public use.
PERSONAL PROPERTY
Several notable cases reached the supreme court in connection
with personal property taxes during 1959. Ohio Revised Code sec-
tion 5711.22 provides that personal property shall be listed and as-
sessed at seventy per cent of its true value, except for certain personal
property used in business, which is to be listed and assessed at fifty
per cent of its true value. Although this statute was changed in some
respects in 1959, the provisions applicable to the following decisions
remain unchanged. In one case," an appeal from a decision of the
Board of Tax Appeals, the owner of a commercial greenhouse con-
tended that benches, ground beds, fertilizers, water hoses, cultivators,
wheelbarrows, and similar equipment should be listed at fifty per
cent because the property represented "engines, machinery, tools, and
implements" either "of a manufacturer" or "used in agriculture"
within the meaning of those words as used in the statute. The judges
being equally divided as to the merits of the case (one judge not par-
ticipating), the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals was affirmed.
A second case concerned the assessment of intangible tax upon in-
come-producing shares of stock where there was a difference in the
amounts of dividends paid on various shares of stock having the same
market value on tax-listing day.' This novel question arose because
the appellees owned shares of General Container Corporation, and,
by agreement with the St. Regis Paper Company (not pursuant to
corporate action by General Container), the shares of General Con-
tainer were exchanged for shares of St. Regis. Prior to the exchange
St. Regis paid $1.35 per share in dividends. After the exchange St.
Regis paid an additional forty-five cents per share dividend to all
shareholders of common stock. On January 1, 1956, the taxpayers
listed their shares of St. Regis as having an income yield of forty-
6. Carney v. Cleveland City School Dist. Pub. Library, 169 Ohio St. 65, 67, 157 N.E.2d 311,
313 (1959).
7. In re Application of Magnetic Springs Foundation, 165 Ohio St. 180, 134 N.E.2d 152
(1956); Good Samaritan Hosp. Ass'n v. Glander, 155 Ohio St. 507, 99 N.E.2d 473 (1951);
Board of Educ. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 149 Ohio St. 564, 80 N.E.2d 156 (1948).
8. Yoder Bros., Inc. v. Bowers, 169 Ohio St. 211, 158 N.E.2d 518 (1959).
9. Pickering v. Bowers, 168 Ohio St. 569, 156 N.E.2d 820 (1959).
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five cents per share for the year 1955. The Tax Commissioner,
upon petition for redetermination, assessed taxes upon the shares on
the basis of an income yield of $1.80 per share, that being the total
of dividends paid on St. Regis shares outstanding during the year.
The Tax Commissioner's theory was that since $1.80 was paid on
stock which had been outstanding during the whole year and since the
intangible tax is a property tax and not an income tax, $1.80 per
share was the income yield'0 as to the taxpayer. However, the Ohio
Supreme Court upheld the taxpayers' contention (affirming the deci-
sion of the Board of Tax Appeals), stating that the measure for the
assessment of intangible tax is dependent upon the dividends paid
during the year on the specific shares of stock.
It might be noted that Ohio Revised Code section 5711.22 was
amended during 195911 and the provision requiring investments that
have not yielded any income during the calendar year to be listed and
assessed as unproductive investments at their true monetary value on
tax-listing day, has been enlarged by including investments that have
not been outstanding for the full calendar year next preceding tax-
listing day.
In another case, the Board of Tax Appeals, reversing an order of
the Tax Commissioner, held that an installation charge for bowling
alley equipment, which charge was not refundable in the event that
the lease was terminated, constituted a deferred charge and was not
subject to taxation as tangible personal property.' 2 Under the terms
of the lease the taxpayer paid $500 installation charges for each "pin-
spotter." The total amount was not treated on the taxpayer's books
as an asset and the amount was being written off at the rate of ten
per cent per year for Federal Income Tax purposes. Perhaps the
most significant fact was that the lessor paid the personal property
tax which was subsequently invoiced to the lessee.
A number of appeals from the Board of Tax Appeals which were
disposed of by the supreme court 13 involved the application of Ohio
Revised Code section 5701.08 to stored materials and merchandise.
Since there has been a major revision in this code section, a detailed
discussion of these decisions is unwarranted.
SALES AND USE TAxATiON
Numerous legislative changes were made in chapter 5739 of the
Ohio Revised Code. Some of the more significant changes are as
follows: The definition of "person" in Ohio Revised Code sections
10. The phrase "income yield" is defined in OHIo REv. CODE § 5701.10 as being "the ag-
gregate amount paid as income by the obligor, trustee, or other source of payment to the owner
or holder of an investment, whether including the taxpayer or not ... 
11. Omo REV. CODE § 5711.22 (Supp. 1959).
12. Stone Bowling Co. v. Bowers, 160 N.E.2d 751 (Ohio Bd. Tax App. 1958).
13. American Can Co. v. Bowers, 169 Ohio St. 81, 157 N.E.2d 340 (1959).
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5739.01"4 and 5741.0115 has been amended to include receivers, as.
signees, trustees in bankruptcy, estates, joint ventures, clubs, and
societies; Ohio Revised Code section 5739.0116 has been amended to
include taxation of transactions by which printed, lithographic, multi-
lithic, photostatic, or other productions or reproductions of written
matter are furnished or transferred, and transactions by which lodg-
ings are furnished by a hotel to transient guests who are occupying
sleeping accommodations for not more than thirty days; Ohio Revised
Code section 5739.0217 exempts from taxation building materials sold
to construction contractors for incorporation into a structure under a
construction contract with the state or a political subdivision thereof,
or for incorporation into a house of public worship or religious edu-
cation, or a building used exclusively for charitable purposes; and,
Ohio Revised Code section 5739.0118 has been amended so that a
construction contract, pursuant to which tangible personal property
is incorporated into a structure or improvement so as to become a
part of the real property, is excluded from the definition of a "sale"
where the construction contractor is the consumer of the personal
property.
The last legislative change mentioned above would seem to nul-
lify the supreme court's decision in Marietta Concrete Corporation
v. Bowers,"9 where concrete panels were sold and incorporated into
a building under a contract in which the consideration for the panels
was agreed upon separately from the consideration of installation.
In another supreme court decision2° involving the interpretation
of Ohio Revised Code section 5739.01, it was held that where an in-
dividual was the sole owner and operator of a motor transportation
business holding certificates issued by the PUCO and the ICC in his
own name, and he transferred all his motor equipment to a corpora-
tion in which he was sole stockholder, which transfer was subsequent-
ly approved, the fact that the individual used equipment in a public
utility service for a time after the sale but before approval of trans-
fers did not deprive the sale of its exempted status under the provi-
sion exempting equipment to be used directly in the rendition of a
public utility service. In a somewhat related case,2' the supreme court
held that a purchaser of a truck, who entered into a lease with a pub-
lic utility company whereby the truck was to be used exclusively in
the rendition of public utility service, was entitled to a certificate of
14. OHIO REV. CODE § 5739.01 (Supp. 1959).
15. OHIO REV. CODE § 5741.01 (Supp. 1959).
16. OHIO REV. CODE § 5739.01 (Supp. 1959).
17. OHIO REV. CODE § 5739.02(B) (14) (Supp. 1959).
18. OHIO REV. CODE § 5739.01 (Supp. 1959).
19. 168 Ohio St. 510, 156 N.E.2d 312 (1959).
20. Victory Express Inc. v. Bowers, 169 Ohio St. 227, 158 N.E.2d 514 (1959).
21. State ex rel. Paul Stutler, Inc. v. Yacobucci, 169 Ohio St. 20, 157 N.E.2d 357 (1959).
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title without payment of a sales or use tax. The court stressed the
fact that it is the use of the thing rather than the character of the
user that is determinative of tax exemption, and noted that Ohio Re-
vised Code sections 5741.01 (C) (1) and (2) excluded from the defi-
nition of "use" a thing consumed directly in the rendition of a public
utility service. This code provision was amended in 1959 and no
longer contains this exclusion.
In Union Building & Construction Corporation v. Bowers2 3 an
appellate court held that where a parent corporation, which was en-
gaged in the business of highway construction, had a wholly owned
subsidiary holding title to construction machinery and equipment, and
which subsidiary "rented" such items to the parent corporation, such
rentals were subject to use tax. The corporations in question were
both foreign corporations and had the same board of directors and
officers. At the time of transfer of equipment there was no payment
of money. The subsidiary entered on a memorandum of account a
debit against the parent for the "rental" and the parent entered a
credit to the subsidiary. The above memoranda were records kept
in the ordinary course of business by both companies and the entries
were not entered on the books of the companies. Subsequently, the
subsidiary cancelled the rental charges. The principal argument of
the appellant was that since the equipment corporation was a wholly
owned subsidiary there was but a single corporation and, hence, no tax
due. The court, relying on the decision in Rochez Brothers, Incorpo-
rated v. Bowers,24 affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals
and held that the transaction was taxable.
An interesting question was raised in DeFille Photography, In-
corporated v. Bowers25 as to the time a taxpayer becomes obligated
to pay sales taxes. The appellant sold portraits under contracts call-
ing for payment in installments, and required the purchasers to exe-
cute promissory notes. It was the custom of the appellant to refrain
from completing the portraits until the contract price was paid. Ap-
pellant argued that the sales tax was not due until the price was paid
or the property transferred. However, the court held that under
Ohio Revised Code section 5739.01 (H), the "sale" occurred "upon
the assumption of.. . mutual obligations."26
INHERITANCE TAXATION
Although there were no particularly significant decisions handed
down in this area during the past year, several statutory amendments
22. OHIo REv. CODE § 5741.01 (C) (Supp. 1959).
23. 158 N.E.2d 386 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958). See also discussion in Corporations section, p.
364 supra.
24. 166 Ohio St. 396, 143 N.E.2d 123 (1957).
25. 169 Ohio St. 267, 159 NXE.2d 443 (1959).
26. Id. at 275, 159 N.E.2d at 448.
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